Emergency Traffic Management Plan

Port of Dover

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Contents

Associated Documents

Emergency Response Plan

SMo RA 0010 – Traffic Management

Glossary

BF – Border Force

BZ – Buffer Zone

CIP – Check-In Plaza

DRB – Drivers Reception Building

DPM – Duty Port Master

ERP – Emergency Response Plan

ETMP – Emergency Traffic Management Plan

IT – Information Technology

LGV – Large Goods Vehicle

PAF – Police Aux Frontiéres

PHD – Passenger Handling Building

PPE – Personal Protection Equipment

RA – Restricted area

RI – Ribbon Island

TM- Traffic Management

VSB – Vehicle Search Building

1. Overview

1.1 Purpose

To supplement the Emergency Response Plan in the event of disruption to traffic routes, (Inbound and Outbound) by providing Operational Response (Bronze), with traffic management options and solutions during the response and recovery stages of a critical incident, supporting the Emergency Response and Business Continuity plans thereby enabling Port operations to be maintained, reducing the impact on our broader local community and maintaining our reputation as a world class port.

1.2 Background

The Port of Dover is the largest passenger ferry port in northern Europe. In 2015, 4,972,041 vehicles of all types and 13,008,400 passengers travelled through the Port. At peak times up to 400 lorries an hour arrive at the Port to leave the UK and the largest ships have the ability to carry over 1000 cars per crossing. The Port operates 24 hours a day and is a community in its own right comprising of the public, DHB employees, our partners, ferry operators, Border Force staff and other stakeholders.

The Eastern Docks can be split into two distinct areas;

- Restricted Area. (That defined secure area covered by the berths and vehicle lanes), and
- Controlled Area. (Everywhere else).

Traffic flow can also be split into two distinct areas that traverses the areas described above;

- Inbound
- Outbound

Inbound traffic is that which has travelled to the UK and Outbound is that which is intending to leave the UK. Each has its own unique traffic flow pattern that in turn can be further classified into vehicle type.

All vehicles and passengers, inbound or outbound, are subject to Border Control checks. Officers from Kent Police and the UK Border Force (BF) are positioned at Inbound and Outbound Control checkpoints and the Police Aux Frontiers (PAF) carry out their checks at the Outbound Control checkpoint before allowing entry into France. These checkpoints are fixed and any re-location of them, either short or long term, will require consultation and agreement.

1.3 Scope

Any critical incident can have a huge impact on the movement of traffic through the Port; therefore a flexible plan adaptable to the prevailing circumstances is vital for business continuity, for the public, our partners and stakeholders.

Because no two incidents are identical it would be impossible to prescribe for every eventuality. Critical Incidents can occur from many sources and are very likely to impact on traffic flows.

This plan aims to set out the core requirements of traffic management in response to the consequences of those risks as identified in the Corporate Risk Register such as;

- Road Traffic Crashes
- Explosions
- Cliff fall
- Fire
- Chemical leak

- Bomb threat
- CBRN(E) event
- Severe weather
- Marine and berthing based incidents
- Any other emergency or incident having a severe impact on Port operations or port community.

2. Activation

2.1 Trigger

In general terms the Emergency Traffic Management Plan (ETMP) will be activated when, due to an incident, it is necessary to alter existing approved Inbound and/or Outbound routes because;

- The Emergency Response Plan (ERP) has been activated
- An exclusion zone has been put up around an incident and/or it is necessary to carry out effective investigations.
- An approved route has become blocked or inaccessible for any reason.
- That blockage or exclusion zone will have an adverse effect on Port operations
- To allow traffic to continue beyond a certain point on an approved route would put people at risk of harm.

The triggers can manifest singularly or in any combination. Not all triggers need to be met to warrant activation.

It may not be necessary to activate the ETMP for every critical incident as not all incidents may adversely affect traffic flow. However, in those cases the Incident Co-ordinator will regularly assess the impact the incident is having on traffic flow and activate the plan if necessary. The Incident Co-ordinator should also bear in mind that any decision to activate the plan will in itself have serious implications on port operations and is likely to be manpower intensive, particularly in the set-up phase.

2.2 Key Points

Certain locations within the Eastern Docks are 'key points', either because of their function and/or inability and difficulty to relocate them. **It is the intention that, whenever it is possible to do so, traffic should be directed or re-routed to these 'key points', either directly or indirectly.**

The key points are: *(See Appendix A for full explanation)*

- **Outbound Controls** – The main border checkpoint for all vehicles and passengers. Utilised by all agencies, primarily PAF who have dedicated IT on site and difficulty in re-locating
- **Check-in Plaza** – The primary vehicular check in point for all ferry operators with their own dedicated IT on site
- **Vehicle Search Building (VSB)** – The search and security facility for vehicles and persons leaving the country.
- **Cyclamen Portals** – Important detection areas for anti terrorism under the control of BF and Kent Police
- **Inbound Controls** – BF and Kent Police border check points. Re-locatable with conditions.

2.3 Additional Signage

During working hours it may be possible to utilise our Principal Contractor to bolster and assist with road closures and diversions. The contractor has agreed to assist if possible (chargeable), they normally have sufficient traffic signage on site and are well-versed in traffic management and associated health and safety issues. [1]

2.4 Method

Before making a decision to divert traffic the Incident Co-ordinator (bronze/silver) must take into account the incident location (ERP Zone), incident type and the impact on Port operations. Having reached the decision that it is safe and appropriate to divert traffic, (it may not always be the case), the Incident Co-ordinator, in conjunction with the Terminal Control Officer, must then decide on the most appropriate diversion route for the prevailing circumstances. (See 2.2 above). The Port of Dover Police, together with the Security Provider, will instigate the diversion route as directed by the Incident Co-ordinator calling for the assistance of the Principal Contractor if considered necessary.

In the spirit of working together and in the interests of business continuity, ferry operators have agreed that, if safe and appropriate, their ground staff will assist with traffic management on the berth area, primarily in the vicinity of their own operations.

- Incident Co-ordinators should direct such requests for assistance through the Duty Managers of each of the ferry operators and fully explain what is needed. When making such requests it should be borne in mind that Ferry Operators have their own commitments and a finite number of staff.

Once the diversion route is set up and running, the Incident Co-ordinator should then decide:

- Whether a physical presence is required to remain at vulnerable points along the diversion route or
- Is the temporary signage sufficient on its own? (Preferred option).

3. Routes

3.1 General

It is not the intention of this document to prescribe and detail every diversion route. The Port is a dynamic environment with a large number of options and variables and it would be impossible to prescribe routes for all eventualities and locations. Ultimately, the decision for the appropriate route lies with the Incident Co-ordinator in conjunction with the Terminal Control Officer. However, there are some routes that are tried and tested or offer no alternative because of their location. *(Options at Appendix C).*

3.3 Staff / Permit Holder Routes

Where any staff route is disrupted, staff and other permit holders will use tourist routes until able to return to that disrupted route.

3.4 National Decision Model - This diagram, (on the following page), illustrates the processes to follow when implementing a diversion. It can be seen that it is a recurring process, dependent on the information presented as the incident progresses.

[1] Verbal agreement pending negotiation and inclusion in contract at renewal stage


Business Continuity
Key Points
Route Availability
Signage
Staffing of Points
Legality?
DHB Policy?
Protocols and Obligations (BF, Kent Police, PAF, Operators
What is happening or has happened.
What do I know so far?
Do I need to do anything now? What if I do nothing?
What do I know so far?
What can go wrong?
Is anyone at risk of harm?
Can we cope without external assistance?
Diversion set up – is it working?
Information and Intelligence
Assess Threat/ Risks - and develop a Working Strategy
Take Action and Review
Business Continuity
Identify Options and Contingencies
Consider Powers and Policy
Key Points
Route Availability
Signage
Staffing of Points
Legality?
DHB Policy?
Protocols and Obligations, (BF, Kent Police, PAF, Operators)

4. Health and Safety

4.1 Risk Assessment

The Port of Dover Generic risk assessment **SMo RA 0010** for traffic management is applicable and current.

Employees of other agencies and operators should refer to their own risk assessment applicable to the task being undertaken.

It is important to emphasise the importance of self preservation as well as the protection of others. The Port is a very busy environment with a huge number of vehicles of all sizes and types travelling through it every day. When moving in and around these vehicles one should always bear in mind that the driver, being in a different environment, may not be as aware of his immediate surroundings as he or she should be. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that Personal Protection Equipment (PPE) is clean, appropriate, in good condition, is being worn and if carrying out traffic control extends the full length of the arms. Hand signals should be clear, concise and in line with the training given. Controlling a diversion point can also be quite stressful, especially if drivers feel it necessary to stop and ask questions. Remaining calm and pleasant under these circumstances not only enforces our professionalism, but also assists in making a potentially confusing situation less stressful for our customers and co-workers.

Appendix A - Key Points

Outbound

1. Outbound Controls

This is the main checkpoint for all vehicles and passengers who wish to enter France. It is used by all agencies, but in particular by the 'Police Aux Frontiéres' (PAF) under the juxtaposed agreement contained within the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002. The PAF have their own Information Technology (IT) sited in their permanent booths, adjacent offices and in the coach search bay situated just after the main control point. Because of the importance of the bespoke IT it would be very difficult for PAF to carry out their function elsewhere. **Therefore, as far as it is reasonably practicable to do so, every effort must be made to re-route traffic to this point**. PAF have stated that if absolutely necessary, and as a last resort, they may be able to re-locate but will require assistance with communications to allow checks to continue. *(See 'Inbound Controls' below for BF and Kent Police requirements)*.

2. Check-In Plaza

The Check-In Plaza (CIP) is the primary vehicular check-in point for all ferry operators with access via Compactor Corner and Eastern Arm North. Any full blockage on these two routes will likely bring Port operations to a halt and alternate access to the CIP is very limited and difficult. (See Appendix C – Diversion Routes).

The secondary check-in point is the Drivers Reception Building (DRB). This area has very limited parking facilities and it does not have the capability of managing the normal influx of traffic. Traffic should not be diverted to this point as an alternate to the main check-in booths.

3. Vehicle Search Buildings – Freight and Car

The VSB's are the primary searching areas for goods vehicles, cars and their occupants. It is operated by the Security Provider and is a tool in UK security including terrorism. The Department for Transport (DFT) have stated that in emergency circumstances a reduced number of searches are permissible and in exceptional circumstances searching can be suspended completely; however the decision for this sits at Strategic (Gold) level.

Inbound

1. Cyclamen Portals

The Cyclamen portals are situated at two inbound points and are a primary tool in UK security including terrorism. They fall under the responsibility of BF and Kent Police and it is a requirement of this site that 100% of vehicles travel through these portals before exiting the Port. Therefore, every effort must be made to re-route inbound traffic through one or both of the portal sites.

Should it not be possible to route traffic through either or both of the portal sites it is imperative that early contact is made with the duty BF Manager who should be briefed of the circumstances and proposed route changes. By doing this any conflict of interests are likely to be avoided.

Strict BF protocols exist when both portal sites are unavailable. In these circumstances the BF Duty Manager will inform the appropriate BF Director of the prevailing circumstances. A decision will then be made whether to deploy one or more mobile detection units, (MRDU's), to re-enable scanning. DHB will assist in providing suitable locations for the MRDU's on the diversion route.

However, the presence or use of the Equipment shall not compromise the Board's right to run the operation of the Port of Dover as the Board, in its absolute discretion but taking due cognisance of the importance of Programme Cyclamen, shall decide.[2]

This is a two-way process and it is vitally important that sufficient information is given at an early stage in the process to allow for an informed decision, such as:

- Type of incident.
- Location of incident and any cordoned area.
- What risks are involved, (if any)?
- Expected duration.
- Expected traffic flow.

2. Inbound Controls

Inbound controls are located at the Car Hall and Freight Search Area. The former location is staffed by Kent Police and both sites are staffed by BF. In the event of either of these areas becoming inoperative due to an on-going incident, and at the request of the incident co-ordinator, both agencies have stated that they would be willing to relocate temporarily to another suitable location. The Incident Co-ordinator should liaise with the Duty Managers of each agency to discuss their needs, and as far as is possible location preferences.

BF and Kent Police require suitable space to safely stop vehicles, talk to occupants and if necessary carry out searches. There are no specific I.T. needs as both agencies have some capacity for portable equipment. BF requires that once a temporary check point has been agreed, that no traffic proceed beyond that point until their officers are in situ. There are real and current security issues behind this requirement and it should always be adhered to as far as is possible.

[2] Extract from the Licence to Install and Maintain Cyclamen Equipment dated 2006

Appendix B – Diversion Routes

Pull Out Aide Memoire

Diversion Routes (Not prescriptive)

Outbound

Buffer Zone Closure

The Buffer Zone, (BZ), was completed in December 2015 and comprises of 10 vehicle lanes with the capacity to hold 220 large goods vehicles. It is extremely unlikely that that this large area will be compromised in its entirety and that some degree of access into the port will be capable of being sustained thereby maintaining business continuity. However, contingencies were built into the new design and in the unlikely event that access is not possible via the BZ the following diversion route is to be used;

Method

- Outbound traffic will be diverted onto the inbound route at the front of the Port via the barrier adjacent to the short term car park, and then onto the A2 only lane of the Dock Exit Road.
- Traffic will then use the inbound car lane until the merge with the coach selection lane and take that lane. (TM needed to push over)
- Just beyond the coach selection point traffic will then travel north east through the southern section of the White Car Park, across the front of the tourist selection kiosk, then through the northern section of the White Car park and finally turning right into the PAF Controls. Access through these areas is via the pre-determined twist post access points. (TM required)

- ***Primary Action 1*** - Inbound freight is diverted across to the southern most freight lane at the point where it exits the Cyclamen Portals and then continues in this lane through freight controls.
- ***Primary Action 2*** – Inbound cars are diverted across to the northern inbound car lane at a point where it exits the Cyclamen Portals and then continues in this lane through BF controls.
- ***Primary Action 3*** – Inbound cars are denied access to the southern exit route following pre-selection. (BF officers to be informed and re-direct traffic if necessary)
- ***Primary Action 4*** - Exit from the Freight Search Area onto the Dock Exit Road is prohibited and the exit closed. All freight is to use Olympic Way. (BF officers to be informed and re-direct traffic if necessary)

Staffing (minimum):

- Entrance to the Eastern Docks
- The barriers situated in the 15 min car park adjacent to the Dock Exit Road
- The Dock Exit Road at the junction where it meets the freight exit and coach exit lanes.
- At the point where traffic crosses the Inbound Tourist lanes
- At the point where traffic turns right out of the White Car Park on the approach to PAF controls

Best practice has shown that it is preferable to operate a contra flow system, holding traffic at the Port Entrance when ships are disembarking. Depending on outbound traffic flow factors, (season, time of day etc.), and the expected duration of the diversion, consideration should be given to the implementation of the Dover Traffic Assessment Process (TAP).

See screenshots below and also Plan 1.


Athol Terrace
'D' Ramp


South Return Road
Upper Road (Elevated)

North Camber Way / Compactor Corner Closure (See Plan 2) (It is highly likely for queuing traffic to extend out of the Port).

- Tourist traffic is directed into the Restricted Area via the Airlock adjacent to the VSB
- Freight is directed into the restricted area via Gate E and across the DRB car park.
- All traffic travels through Eastgate in the wrong direction turning right onto Eastern Arm North and then into the CIP.
- Coning used to separate opposing traffic in front of the DRB

Staffing (minimum):

- Roundabout at the entrance to the Eastern Docks
- Back Road East for tourist traffic into the Airlock (G4S from the VSB?)
- Back Road East for freight traffic into Gate E (G4S from the VSB?)
- South Camber Way in the vicinity of the Airlock to facilitate tourist traffic onto the Eastern Service Road
- South Camber Way in the vicinity of Gate E to facilitate freight traffic onto the Eastern Service Road



Eastern Arm North Closure (See Plan 3)

Because of the nature of this road it is highly unlikely that it will be fully out of commission from a non-hazardous incident. However, should this unfortunately occur access to the CIP would have to be via Gate F located on The Broadway junction with The Eastern Arm. Traffic should be directed to use lanes 1, 2, and 3 of 'Q' Park on the approach to The Broadway, thus reducing disruption to berth side operations.

Be aware that LGVs will not be able to turn into Gate F from The Broadway and will need to turn into Hammonds compound (dependent on use at the time) and access Gate F via The Eastern Arm. The Ribbon Islands (RI) inside the CIP are an issue for access, freight will not be able to turn left at this point and it may be necessary to make a temporary opening.



N.B. Any re-routing for North Camber Way and the Eastern Arm North closures will require DRB operations to cease for the duration of the exercise. Any vehicle without a ticket will need to be dock exited until the DRB is able to resume business post diversion.

Inbound

Inbound Car Hall Closure

In the event that the inbound Car Hall is closed, traffic is able to use either the northern or southern inbound tourist route.

Berth Area

Overhead Roadway Closure or Inbound Routes Disrupted

Should the Overhead Roadway be unusable, or an incident elsewhere has rendered other inbound routes unavailable, i.e. an exclusion zone is in force for a suspected explosive device, then the following points should be taken into consideration:

- Utilising Gates A to E located on the RA fence line for Inbound Traffic.
- The choice of gates and route to them is dependent on the incident location, **however every effort should be made to ensure that traffic is routed through the Cyclamen Portals whenever possible**.
- The Terminal Controller should, in consultation with Port Control, the Duty DHM and Ferry Operators, consider staggering the discharge of incoming ferries. This has proven to be best practice in the past and prevents problems in the immediate areas of the discharges.
- Assistance of ferry operator staff should be sought to help with directing traffic onto the selected route.

There are plans held in Terminal Control that show suggested routes for varying areas of disruption throughout the Port. These plans are an aid only and will require updating following the TMI project.

Staff / Permit Holder Routes

Where any staff route is disrupted, staff and other permit holders will use tourist routes until able to return to that disrupted route.

Appendix C - Contact Details

DHM:

Internal 5423

Duty Mobile Shortcut 2445

Duty Mobile 07836 262713

Terminal Control:

5513

Port Control:

Internal 5530

Police Sergeant:

Internal 5752

Mobile 07717851571

BF:

Immigration External 01304 668110

Customs External 01304 206789

Kent Police Ports Unit:

Internal 73152121

External 01303 297320

Kent Police:

101

P&O:

Internal 3852

External 01304 862584

DFDS:

Internal 3056

External 01304 874020

MyFerry Link:

External 01304 828421

Gold, Silver, Media, Technical Support:

Refer to the Emergency Call Out Rota located on the front page of the Intranet under 'Corporate Information'

Appendix D - Plans

Plan 1. Back Road East Closure

Plan 2. North Camber Way/Compactor Corner Closure

Plan 3. Easter Arm North Closure

PLAN 1

Drawing number
7CU01-F001-SP-IO

Key
- Control Points
- Cones

Project
7CU01
Emergency Response Plan

PLAN 2


Drawing number
7CU01-F001-SP-IO
Key
Control Points
Cones
Tourist
Freight
Back Road East
The Fan (Elevated)
Port Service Road
North Camber Way
South Camber Way
Upper Road (Elevated)
Central Service Road
'S' Ramp
Assembly Park B
'N' Ramp
Assembly Park A
Eastern Service Road
Assembly Park Q
Eastern Arm North
Four Square
Five Square
The Breakwater
Project
7CU01
Emergency Response Plan


PLAN 3
Drawing number
7CU01-F001-SP-IO
Key
Control Points
Cones
Back Road East
The Fan (Elevated)
Port Service Road
Upper Road (Elevated)
North Camber Way
South Camber Way
Central Service Road
Assembly Park B
Assembly Park A
Assembly Park C
Eastern Service Road
Four Square
Five Square
Project
7CU01
Emergency Response Plan

Version Control Schedule (*only requires completion if hard copies of manual supplied)*

Date	Version No	Section	Changes Made	Name
01/07/16	3	All	Changes throughout to reflect new Buffer Zone and alterations to outbound/inbound routes due to the conclusion of the TMI project.	Jon Shearwood