



Site Specific Evacuation Plan

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"The purpose of evacuation is to move people and (where appropriate) other living creatures away from an actual or potential danger to a place that is safer for them. Shelter is a place where evacuees can stay and receive support".

HMG Evacuation and Shelter Guidance 2014

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Associated Documents

[Evacuation Decision Document](#) – QD310

[Evacuation Checklist](#) – QD312

[Policy File](#) – QD44



1. Overview

1.1 Purpose of the Plan

The plan considers the evacuations of Port of Dover personnel, Frontier Control staff, shipping operator staff, concessionaires, crew and the public, from either the Eastern or Western Docks or a vessel in berth.

A requirement to evacuate, in full or part may be brought about by several of the identified risks within the Port of Dover and Kent Resilience Forum 'Risk Registers'.

The intention of the plan is to establish procedures to advise for either, dispersal, shelter, or evacuation where necessary, for all or part of the affected area, as a result of :-

- Fire
- Explosion
- Flood
- Gas Leak
- Bomb Threat
- CRBN(E) event
- Firearm and Weapon Attacks
- Any other emergency

This plan should not be looked upon as a stand alone document. It should be read in conjunction with other operational and strategic plans/procedures such as:

- Dover Harbour Board '[Emergency Response Plan](#)'
- [Control Centres Evacuation Plan](#)

1.2 Background

The Port of Dover is the major cross channel port. It is the largest passenger ferry port in northern Europe, handling more than half of all international UK ferry passengers. It is the leading 'roll-on/roll off' (RoRo) port and second most important cruise terminal in the UK. The present harbour encloses 330 hectares. The Port is divided up into two distinct areas of activity; Eastern Docks which provide the main Ro-Ro passenger and freight facilities, and the Western Docks which provide facilities for cruise ships in two separate cruise terminals, aggregate processing and a 400 berth marina. For the purpose of this plan, the Port of Dover includes vessels in berths and all land owned and operated by Dover Harbour Board and locally known as the Eastern and Western Docks.

The Port of Dover has no residential properties, it is a 24/7 commercial maritime transport facility between the UK and the continent ('The Gateway to Europe'). It has a diverse range of businesses and Government agencies operating within its environs. In high season, (August) there may be as many as 10,000 people in the port, this includes Port of Dover staff, shipping operator staff, crews and landside staff and the public. This number is significantly influenced by seasonal activity. In low season, (February), this may be only as many as a 1000 people.

The Government advice on shelter and evacuation has been reviewed and considered during the production of this plan. The National Resilience Planning Assumptions (NRPA) for evacuation states planners should assume:



- Those who are vulnerable, (e.g. the elderly, those with restricted mobility, sensory impairment etc.), will need to be identified and assisted. They will need to be assessed rapidly and cared for and may require special transport and equipment to assist their removal to a place of safety.
- Once at temporary shelters, people will require a range of facilities, (e.g. food, bedding, clothing, washing, medical etc.), to be provided by Local Authorities with assistance from the voluntary sector.
- Security may become an issue in evacuated areas, and people should also be discouraged from returning home until it is safe. This may mean medium-term extra community policing/policing may be required for cordons.
- In the medium term, many people will disperse to stay with relatives or friends but a proportion may need to be sheltered / moved to temporary accommodation.
- Full recovery from a serious event can take some considerable time and will involve significant resources with a wide spread evacuation likely to lead to interlinked economic, environmental, social and health dimensions.

1.3 Scope

This plan identifies a range of tactical options relative to evacuation but, because every 'emergency' is a different event with its own unique aspects, the range of options cannot be said to be either exhaustive or complete. However, by following this range of tactical options and activating the Port of Dover 'Emergency Response Plan' (ERP) the persons charged with the responsibility for implementing an evacuation will be giving consideration to most known and anticipated issues.

This plan acknowledges that evacuation may be a staged process which may include the options of:

- Dispersal
- Sheltering
- Partial Evacuation
- Full Evacuation

1.4 Scalability

The principles of this plan may be used for any scale of evacuation. The plan is intended to assist responding agencies at **Tactical** level, offering the planning processes necessary to invoke an evacuation. The planning processes remain consistent and constant throughout no matter what scale of evacuation is planned.

On the next page is a table highlighting potential scales of evacuation:-



Definition	Decision to trigger taken by	Resources likely To be required for this magnitude	Likely magnitude of people affected	Example
Vessel Evacuation	Master of Ship & Ship Operators. Police Sergeant, DPM	Operator shipping staff, PoDPol and Port staff	Dependant upon vessel being evacuated. Scale to be used as below	Cargo, Ferry or Cruise vessel.
Small scale/ local evacuation	Police Sergeant, DPM	PODPol and Port staff	Up to 50	One zone / building affected, small site specific evacuation
Medium-scale evacuation	Police Sergeant , DPM or KentPol rep.	PODPol, Port staff and local responders (KentPol, KFRS, SECAmbs)	50 to 250	Evacuation of 2 to 3 zones
Large-scale evacuation	Police Sergeant , DPM or KentPol Bronze / Silver multi agency commander	PODPol, Port staff, local responders and County resources	250 to 1000	Evacuation of RZ in high season, 4 or more zones, all RZ or Non RZ
Mass or wide area evacuation	Bronze /Silver multi agency commander	PODPol, Port staff, local responders and County resources	More than 1000	Evacuation of an entire Dock complex

2. **Summary of Key Principles**

This plan assumes that a 'Critical Incident' or 'Emergency' (as defined in the Emergency Response Plan - ERP) has been or is being declared and the requirement to evacuate has been identified.

2.1 **Dispersal**

Dispersal is simply directing people away from danger. It is a form of evacuation, though may not require as much careful planning as a full or partial evacuation.


2.2 **Evacuation (or partial evacuation)**

During an emergency it may be necessary to evacuate staff and the public from the Port (or parts of the Port). Evacuating a large number of people requires careful and extensive planning. Evacuation can take on a number of guises; Full evacuation is taking everyone from an area of danger to a place of safety (e.g. rest centre). Partial evacuation is moving specific groups of people e.g. the vulnerable away from immediate danger while others remain in situ and shelter. **(See section 11 for more details)**

2.3 **Sheltering**

Sheltering from an event may be undertaken either 'in situ' (including workplace) or following an evacuation to a designated site. In many cases a combined response may be required, with 'in situ' sheltering recommended for some areas (i.e. those in the possible path of contamination), and evacuation recommended for areas which have more time before the danger materialises.

Figure 1: Stages of evacuation



Source: Chapter 2, Page 10, HMG Evacuation and Shelter Guidance 2014

3. Trigger for the Activation of the Plan

The likely trigger for the activation of this evacuation plan is the belief that people's lives may be endangered by the emergence of a specific risk. Depending on the speed of build up in the prevailing emergency this may be planned and co-ordinated or spontaneous and dynamic ('self evacuation' may be a trigger and / or the decision maker. In the case of a vessel evacuation, this will be the Master/Shipping Operator). However when the trigger for activation comes about, it will be recorded as a policy decision by either the DPM, Silver Commander or Gold. The record of the decision to evacuate should include the rationale behind the decision. In a spontaneous incident the decision may have been made dynamically by a bronze commander (PODPol Sergeant), in this case the decision and the rationale for the decision should be recorded retrospectively.

4. Roles & Responsibilities of Key Players

4.1 Port of Dover Police / Kent Police

The primary areas of Police responsibility at an emergency include:

- Saving of life.
- Co-ordination/liaison between Silver Command and multi agency responders around the scene.
- Informing and mobilising Port Users and 'Griffin' trained staff.
- Warning and informing the public.
- The collation and dissemination of casualty information.
- The identification of the dead on behalf of HM Coroner.
- The prevention of crime.
- Preservation of evidence.

4.2 Kent Fire and Rescue Service

The primary areas of the Fire and Rescue Service responsibility during a major emergency include:

- Life saving through search and rescue.
- Fire fighting and fire prevention.
- The provision of specialist equipment e.g. High Volume Pumps, decontamination facilities, ('Improvised' – anything to hand - wipes / towel / bucket etc. 'Interim' – ladder gantry by FRS, 'Mass Decontamination' (MD) – large scale tents).
- Provision of Detection Identification Monitoring, (DIM), advice to a suspected CBRN(E) event.



4.3 South East Coast Ambulance Service

The primary actions of the Ambulance Service during an emergency include:

- Convey the incident medical team to the scene.
- Establish and determine casualty reception / triage and provide treatment areas on site.
- Provide a focal point for all NHS and medical resources at the site.
- Decontamination facilities (CBRN(E) event or commercial chemical incident).

4.4 Operator Responsibilities – Vessel in Berth Evacuation (Re-affirmed September 2016)

It will be the responsibility of the ships crew and the operators shore side staff to carry out the evacuation and will include:

- Accounting for all passengers and crew ensuring that they have a record of numbers to ensure all those requiring evacuation have been safely evacuated
- Supply staff to manage these passengers whilst they are waiting for further developments. This could involve bussing them to a suitable location as identified by Silver Command if the situation appears to be an on-going one which will last for a lengthy period.
- Supply staff to keep their passengers updated with the current situation, as well as organising any required catering requirements for their passenger's comfort.
- Organise any required overnight accommodation in the event of passengers not being able to return home or continue their onward journey.

4.5 Local Authorities (The Port of Dover is included in this definition as it has a similar role)

The Local Authorities (District, County and Port of Dover) may undertake the following actions during an emergency.

- During the response to the emergency, provide support to the public and the emergency services.
- During an Emergency, dependent upon local arrangements in each administrative area the local authority can provide many key assets to assist, including:
 - Road closures and diversion routes
 - Evacuation transport
 - Rest Centres, Survivor Reception Centres, Family and Friends and Humanitarian Assistance Centres (HAC), including feeding and clothing and other practical assistance to evacuees,

4.6 Environment Agency

The Environment Agency has lead responsibilities in response to flooding and events involving pollution, as well as a regulatory role which may require it to undertake investigation and prosecute those responsible for polluting the environment. During flooding the Environment Agency is responsible for:

- Monitoring meteorological data and the flow of rivers.
- Issuing flood warnings.
- Issuing flood advice.
- Erection of flood defences in conjunction with contractors where appropriate.

4.7 Highways England

The Highways Agency has responsibility for motorways and some designated trunk roads and will provide appropriate pre-warning and information motoring advice to customers.



4.8 Transport

Transport (buses & possibly vessels) can be considered in an evacuation. Ferry Operators will assist in the evacuation, by the provision of people and resources as requested.

5. Evacuation Routes

The Tactical Co-ordinator should consider designing a plan which will afford access as necessary to the scene or different locations within the theatre of operations. It will be necessary to determine a safe route in and out for use by responders.

It may be necessary to identify a separate, safe route for evacuees. It may be necessary to identify contingency routes should the environment be changing due to, for example, rising flood water. Whereas road evacuation and operating routes may represent the norm the Tactical Co-ordinating Group should also be minded to consider routes by air or water borne transport.

6. Management

Rest centres have been identified because they have basic facilities for short term stays. Some of these have capacity for a large number of people, with many rooms, water and toilet facilities.

Within the Eastern Docks the Departure Lounge has been identified as a potential rest centre. It may be considered for small and medium size evacuations if it is determined that it is outside the evacuation zone and unlikely to become 'at risk' during the evacuation operation. **(NOTE: 2016 - This area has limited access and no working toilet facilities therefore temporary arrangements will have to be made).**

Within the Western Docks, Cruise Terminal 1 is the designated 'Survivor Reception Centre' for the Port of Dover and may also be considered as a potential rest centre. It may be considered for small, medium or large size evacuations of Eastern Docks. **(See Appendix 1)**

The Local Authority, (Dover District Council and Kent County Council), have a list of designated rest centres which can be used in the event of short term evacuation. These centres can be accessed by contacting Dover District Council and / or Kent County Council 'duty' Emergency Planner.

7. Warning & Informing

Whilst the potential need for evacuation is being monitored responders, should be considering how potential evacuees will be warned and informed. Depending on the lead time to evacuation, various methods of communication may be considered.

Port of Dover warning and informing procedures and template messages are configured around a colour code:-

RED ALERT Take action

AMBER ALERT Standby; warn and inform

GREEN ALERT All clear

Messages can be delivered in the following ways to ensure widest possible information sharing:-

- Pre-identified address lists with contact details included for email.
- Personal visits to addresses.
- Use of Port IT infrastructure e.g. Paxis & PA.

- Bull-horning (by hand, from vehicle or airborne).
- Use of Port user groups and systems.
- Through company or 'Border Agency' Managers – in particular to meet the needs of their customers.

These communication methods can be activated by Police Communications staff who will have current contact lists and message templates.

8. Assembly Points

The Port has a network of Emergency Assembly Points (EAPs). The Eastern Docks EAPs are in prominent positions and mounted on posts with telephone and first aid equipment mounted on them. In an emergency appropriate assembly points will need to be identified for the evacuees to 'rally' to, which will enable dissemination of further information and instructions in respect of what will happen next. These assembly points need to be activated, (via the Port of Dover 'Emergency Assembly Point Management System' operated by staff in Terminal Control), and should be situated away from the initial danger area. The evacuees need to be informed of these locations.

EAPs should be considered as initial 'rally points' and then used as 'waypoints' to create a safe route away from the hazard and to a place of safety.

9. Port of Dover Emergency Infrastructure

The Port of Dover (Eastern and Western) has been divided up into zones for ease of reference in an emergency. **(See Appendix 2)**

- Each zone has a unique reference number e.g. 1 or 2 or 3 etc.
- Each zone is further sub-divided into smaller areas, each with a reference number linking it to the master zone e.g. in zone 1 the sub-zones are labelled 1.1, 1.2 .1.3 etc.
- The Eastern Docks is divided into eight zones, four inside the Restricted Area, numbered 1- 4 and four outside in the Non Restricted Area numbered 5-8.
- The Western Docks is divided into six zones, numbered 9 – 14 (these zones are similarly sub-divided and linked to the master zone)
- Each zone and sub-zone has a number of clearly identified assembly points, as per the diagram.
- Each assembly point has a unique reference number associated with the zone it is located in. It is equipped with an emergency telephone with direct contact to (a place) and, a cabinet containing location maps, first aid kit and space blankets for immediate use in an emergency (see Fig.1)
- Each assembly point can be used as a rally point in the initial stages of an incident and then used as waypoints to construct a safe route to nominated RVP.



Fig. 1.

10. Control/Co-ordination

10.1 Tactical Co-ordinating Group (TCG) - Silver

The Port of Dover Emergency Response Plan may well have been activated by the DPM and a Tactical Coordinating Group (TCG) (Silver) will have assembled or be in the process of assembling. The TCG, having considered the unfolding circumstances may make a decision to evacuate an area in part or whole. TCG/Silver will record a log of its decisions, the rationale behind those decisions and the nature of the intended tactical plan. TCG/Silver is determining 'how it will be done'. *(A detailed description of the Port of Dover management structure in an emergency is contained in the Port of Dover 'Emergency Response Plan')*



10.2 Operational Co-ordinator (OC) - Bronze

The initial responders will initially perform the role previously described at 'tactical co-ordinating group' until the Port of Dover Emergency Response Plan, tactical co-ordination structure is activated and in place. Subsequently, in support of TCG tactical plan it is likely that a number of Operational Co-ordinators will be appointed. Each Operational Co-ordinator will be responsible for discrete areas of the operation e.g.

- Evacuation Co-ordinator
- Rendezvous points
- Cordons
- Traffic Management
- Site management

11. Assembly Points

11.1 The Decision Process

A decision to evacuate or shelter must be made quickly by the senior managers available using a '**dynamic risk assessment**'. The result of the risk assessment will vary and is dependent on the type of hazard they are facing. It may be safer to shelter than evacuate. The types of hazard could include:

- Fire
- Explosion
- Flood
- Gas Leak
- Bomb Threat
- CBRN(E) event
- Vessel in Berth Evacuation
- Any other emergency

11.2 Risk Based Planning

Planning for evacuation and shelter must be flexible and risk based. It must be based on a Dynamic Risk Assessment of the affected area. Decisions should take in to account the risks of evacuation and review alternative solutions.

11.3 Risk Assessment

A 'dynamic risk assessment' needs to be concluded quickly and efficiently. The main people that would probably be involved in the risk assessment process are:

- Senior officers of the blue light services
- Senior representatives from Dover Harbour Board
- Senior officials of the appropriate Health Service (e.g. NHS or HPA whichever is appropriate in the prevailing emergency)

At the forefront of the risk assessment thought process should be the consideration of what type of evacuees are being evacuated? The type of evacuees may include:

- Port workers; including Port of Dover staff, shipping operator staff, crew on vessels and concessionaires.
- Frontier control staff; including KentPol SB, BF and French PAF.
- Public including; tourists, freight drivers, visitors and contractors.



Once the decision to evacuate has been taken by the senior officers then the type of evacuation needed needs to be decided. The types of evacuation include:

11.4 Dispersal

This is a form of evacuation in which people are simply directed to move away from a particular location without the need for temporary accommodation.

11.5 Shelter

Shelter in place should be considered for no-notice events when:

- there is no time to undertake an evacuation before the hazard arrives;
- going outside would expose people to greater harm or dangerous conditions; or
- the immediate risk is unclear.

'GO IN, STAY IN, AND TUNE IN'.

Buildings can provide significant protection against most risks, and people may be safer seeking shelter in the nearest suitable building, rather than dispersing or evacuating immediately. Once the risk is understood, a decision needs to be made about how long people should remain indoors and whether an evacuation is necessary and could be conducted without exposing people to increased risk.

The advantages of shelter in place will vary, depending on the event. In some scenarios, once the immediate danger has passed it will be safe to go outdoors; in others, shelter may be the safest option for several hours or longer. Evacuation after shelter in place may be necessary for vulnerable people or for the entire population affected.

The sustainability of shelter in workplaces and commercial premises (including shops) will be more limited. If a general evacuation is not deemed necessary, smaller-scale evacuations from workplaces may still be required

Safe areas in buildings can be divided into two types; 'shelter' or 'refuge', each will have characteristics affording a different level of protection for the prevailing risk presented at the time. The differences are explained as follows:-

- Taking refuge or cover from an actual or perceived danger. Refuge provides a more substantial place of safety and may be defined as '***That which shelters or protects from danger, or from distress or calamity; a stronghold which protects by its strength.***
- Shelter is a lesser form of protection and is defined as '***That which covers or defends from injury or annoyance; a screen.***

11.6 Evacuation

Removal of people, and where appropriate other living creatures, away from an actual or potential place of danger to a safer place. Evacuation becomes necessary when the benefits of leaving significantly outweigh the risk of 'sheltering-in-place' (in situ)

Places nominated as refuges would be suitable for use in a scenario where the risk is from explosion, whereas shelter would be suitable in scenarios where contamination is the primary risk.



See Appendix 3 - Shelter Schedule detailing the identified and refuges and shelters in Eastern Docks and Western Docks.

11.7 The Policy Decision (making it, recording it, and communicating it)

The policy decision to evacuate, once made, should be recorded as soon as possible. The record of the decision should reflect who was involved in making it and what the rationale was that lead to the decision being made. The evacuation decision flow chart at **Appendix 4** may be used to assist in the decision making process and the **[Evacuation Decision Document, \(QD310\)](#)**, to formally record the decision in hard copy form though cognisance should also be taken of the fact that existing multi-agency Silver/Tactical groups may have their own unique decision recording templates.

Communication of the evacuation needs to be disseminated to all as quickly and effectively as possible. These methods include:

- Activation of the fire alarm system from Police Communications
- Radio Communications (Port of Dover trunk radio)
- Cascade systems (group emails) to Port User groups including Griffin trained staff
- Paxis system and PA
- Visiting addresses building by building
- Bull-horning (by hand, from vehicle)

11.8 Identification of RVPs and Marshalling Areas

Rendezvous Points and Marshalling should be identified and staffed to initially manage the RVP(s) and Marshalling areas.

11.9 Using the Evacuation Check-list

Responders are encouraged to use the **[Evacuation checklist, QD312](#)**, to quality assure their operation.

11.10 Advice to Those About To Be Evacuated

Depending on the lead time to evacuation, the potential evacuees should be given appropriate advice as necessary which will be influenced by the potential time they will remain evacuated and the arrangements for their reception. Advice issues may include:

Arrangements to evacuate:

- What may be carried e.g. a bag of essential items, a case, or nothing.
- Essential medical items e.g. medication, hearing aids, diabetic equipment.
- Taking valuables.
- Securing properties.
- Bringing mobile phones, chargers, laptop computers to facilitate communication.
- Where they will be evacuated to.
- For how long they will be evacuated.

12. Diversity (Dignity at Work)

One of the principle aims of the diversity strategies of partner agencies is to ensure that people are treated fairly and in a manner that they would want to be treated. This principle is important in the context of evacuation and shelter. Not everyone in our communities will see things the same way.



There may be individuals who are less able than others, possibly through age, illness or infirmity. In planning evacuation in whatever form (dispersal, sheltering in situ or evacuating to another place), planners need to consider how these issues will impact on people's ability to be evacuated or to sustain themselves whilst sheltering.

12.1 Vulnerable People

Within our community there are individuals who may be vulnerable for many reasons. This would include elderly, young, infirm or sick people, those who have learning disabilities or are isolated (by geography or by choice) or through ethnicity or language or any combination of these. Where evacuation and/or shelter is being planned, vulnerable people will need to be identified, seen and provided with an appropriate level of support and assistance.

Maintaining an up-to-date list of the vulnerable people in all our communities will be difficult, given that the population is transient. However, it should be acknowledged that there are many organisations who do know of our communities' vulnerable people through their professional contacts. Those organisations should be called upon to share information and in doing so, identify which people are currently known to be vulnerable and in need of help.

Consideration should be given to cultural and or language issues that may be relevant.

Preparatory or 'quick time' warning and informing activity may reveal cultural and/or language issues that may reflect the make up of the community. These issues should be taken into consideration as the warning and informing activity progresses.

13. Risk Factors – Time of Day, Day of Week, Season of Year – Timing of Evacuation

Responders and in particular co-ordinators will wish to consider the timing of any evacuation. Where a spontaneous incident dictates that evacuation must take place immediately this consideration may not be possible. Where there is some lead time, responders / co-ordinators will consider in detail the timing of the evacuation including:

13.1 Time of day

- Sufficient daylight is required to start and finish the evacuation
- Day of the week may influence resourcing and other factors
- Seasonal influences will determine the prevailing weather and associated risks

13.2 The Weather

Depending of the prevailing weather, Responders / co-ordinators will wish to consider the implications of evacuating in hot/cold and/or wet/dry weather. Such considerations may influence:

- Advice regarding clothing to be taken
- Requirement for hot or cold fluids to drink
- Need for blankets.

13.3 Phasing the Evacuation

Responders / coordinators will wish to consider the phasing of an evacuation where there is sufficient time to do so. It may be necessary to consider prioritising those in greatest need of evacuation or those who are more vulnerable than others. Considerations may include potential evacuees who are:

- In greatest danger of harm.



- The old.
- The young.
- The sick and infirm.
- People with disabilities.
- The more robust, healthy and self-sufficient.

Where responders or co-ordinators prioritise evacuee groups, policy decision records should be recorded.

14. Security

Once evacuated, the security of the Port, evacuees' property and possessions will become a significant issue. All reasonable steps should be taken to prevent the theft or damage to the Port infrastructure, evacuees' property whether it be personal property or property within businesses. Responders / co-ordinators will wish to consider strategy and tactics to safeguard property which may include:

14.1 Anti-crime/looting/security regime strategies:

- The need for cordons to prevent encroachment on evacuees' property (potentially inner and outer cordons)
- Preventative patrolling
- Providing re-assurance to evacuees and their friends and families

14.2 Refusal to evacuate – keeping appropriate records

Other than Common Law powers and 'The Terrorism Act 2000' there is no statutory power to enforce an evacuation. **(See Appendix 5).** It is possible that individuals may refuse to evacuate against responders advice. Where this happens an appropriate record should be made within official record keeping systems e.g. a log of events or a police officers note-book. The record should include who the person is, who may be with them (including pets) and what their reasons are for refusing to evacuate.

15. Assembly Points

15.1 Decision to Return

Once the decision that the need for shelter and or evacuation has ended, and it is safe for people to return, the safe to return message needs to be relayed to everyone by as many means as possible. See communications section for methods of communications available to use.

16. Return and Recovery

The return of evacuees may be a complex issue, which may have considerable safety consequences for the public. The return of evacuees needs to be controlled and co-ordinated by the senior officials at Gold (Support) and Silver Tactical Group.

Gold/ strategic co-ordination is likely to require the creation of a Recovery Working Group who will adopt national and local best practice guidance in the co-ordination of all aspects of the recovery process.

17. Specific Threat – Firearms and Weapon Attacks

Attacks involving firearms and weapons are rare but it is important to be prepared to cope with such an incident.

The important advice below will help you plan.



The National Police Chiefs' Council Guidance is:-

RUN



to a place of safety. This is far better option than to surrender or negotiate. If there is nowhere to go then.....

HIDE



It's better to hide than to confront. Remember to turn your phone to silent and turn off vibrate. Barricade yourself in if you can. Then finally and only when it is safe to do so.....

TELL



the police by calling 999

The more information that you can pass to police the better; but **NEVER** risk your own safety or that of others to gain it.

Consider using CCTV and other remote methods where possible to reduce the risk. If it is safe to do so, think about the following:

- Is it a firearms / weapons incident?
- Exact location of the incident.
- What else are they carrying?
- Number and description of gunmen.
- Moving in any particular direction?
- Type of firearm – long barrelled or handgun?
- Are they communicating with others?
- Number of casualties / people in the area.

The official STAY SAFE film can be viewed at; www.npcc.police.uk/staysafe

IF YOU CAN'T ESCAPE

- Consider locking yourself and others in a room or cupboard.
- Barricade the door then stay away from it.
- If possible choose a room where escape or further movement is possible.
- Silence any sources of noise, such as mobile phones, that may give away your presence.

Armed Police

In the event of an attack involving firearms or weapons, a Police Officer's priority is to protect and save lives.

Please remember:

- Initially they may not be able to distinguish you from the gunmen.
- Officers may be armed and may point guns at you.
- They may have to treat the public firmly. Follow their instructions; keep hands in the air / in view.
- Avoid quick movement towards the officers and pointing, screaming or shouting.



PLAN

Consider the following when planning for a firearms / weapons incident:

- How you would communicate with staff, visitors, neighbouring premises? etc.
- What key messages would you give to them in order to keep them safe?
- Have the ability to secure key parts of the building to hinder free movement of the gunmen?
- Think about how you would lock down and secure your work environment and practice it.
- Think about incorporating this into your emergency planning and briefings?
- Test your plan at least annually?



Appendix 1 – Rest Centre and Survivor Centre Locations


Venue	Address	Contact	Capacity
ED Departure Lounge *AS A POSSIBLE REST CENTRE ONLY*	Eastern Docks	Terminal Control	833*
Cruise Terminal 1 (designated survivor reception centre)	Western Docks	Terminal Control	1200*

*Taken from 'Occupancy Levels' document – 'A Fire Safety Audit' conducted by Port of Dover Port Safety Department in 2009.

For use only if absolutely necessary. This venue has limited access, is not in good order, minimum toilet facilities and seating – consider the provision of temporary toilets.
Access only via vehicle ramp or stairs located north east corner of building




Appendix 2a - Map of Eastern Dock Zones & Location of Assembly Points





Appendix 2b - Map of Western Dock Zones & Location of Assembly Points





Appendix 3 – Eastern Docks Refuge & Shelter Schedule

June 2012 - These are suggested locations only. A structural assessment has been undertaken on selected buildings and risk assessed against a specific threat from blast (Apr12). The structural assessment is included in this appendix to assist in planning and response. The original Home Office document is marked 'confidential' and is held by Port of Dover Police.

Internal Refuge / Shelter Summary (June 2012) Eastern Docks

This table must be read in conjunction with the next table 'Summary of Home Office Vulnerability Assessment (April 2012)

Serial	Building	Refuge Location	Potential Capacity REFUGE	Potential Capacity SHELTER	Staff Accommodated	Comment (strengths / weaknesses
1	Terminal Control Building (GROUND FLOOR)	Syndicate Room 1 & 2, ICT Meeting Room, IT Training Room, Occ Health Medical Room	80	0	Port Safety, Training, Occ Health, ICT Dev.	Internal glass in some rooms, but located around courtyard, protected by TCB building Potential to be main refuge for building. No emergency phone in stairwell
2	Terminal Control Building (ALL OTHER FLOORS)	Internal Fire stairway	60	0	DHB = Planning and Development floor 1 Ops,5 & 6, Tenants = 2, 3 & 4	Good shelter at right at top to floor 5, from this point small windows to outside face, until floor 2 then significant reduced protection to ground floor. No emergency phone in stairwell.
5	AMSA Shed	Mess Room and or toilets	50	0	G4S + travelling Public	Grill in bottom panel of access door (can be covered with plastic sheet) Air Con in toilets, no emergency phones
	Passenger Services Building (West)	Men's & Ladies toilet area.	200	0	Tenants and travelling public	Shelter only in toilet areas due to significant glass at front.
	Passenger Services Building (East)	Men's & Ladies toilet area.	200	0	Tenants and travelling public	No doors , protection from blast, no emergency phones.
	Passenger Access Building at 8&9 Berth.		200		Travelling public	
	Dover Cargo Terminal	Various Cold stores	300	500	DCT staff + travelling public.	Good protection no glass. Cooling system must be switched off prior to use as shelter, no emergency phones
	Admiralty Building		50		DHB engineering staff,	
	Departures	Shelter for large number, No refuge	0	0	Public, travel centre staff, UKBA	Large amount of glass
Total Capacity REFUGE =			1140			Refuge:- That which shelters or protects from danger, or from distress or calamity; a stronghold which protects by its strength.
Total Capacity SHELTER=				500		Shelter:- That which covers or defends from injury or annoyance; a protection; a screen.



Eastern Docks Refuge & Shelter Schedule Cont.

Summary of 'Home Office Vulnerability Assessment' (April 2012)

Threat and Effects on Surveyed Buildings

OUTBOUND THREATS							
Location & Likely Threat	Rest Centre (Departures)	Term. Cont.	Admiralty Building	Cargo Sheds	Passenger Services Building (E)	Passenger Services Building (W)	Pass. Access @ 8&9
Travel Centre Car Park (VBIED-Car)							
Outward Bound Control (VBIED-Car)		Structural- Walls demolished, secondary fragmentation, and collapse					
Coach Search (Suitcase IED)							
Freight Search (VBIED-Small Truck)		Structural-Walls demolished, secondary fragmentation, and collapse					
AMSA (VBIED-Small Truck)		Structural- Walls demolished, secondary fragmentation, and collapse	Structural-Walls demolished, secondary fragmentation, and collapse	Structural-Cladding may suffer some deflection and may be projected inside.	Structural-Walls demolished, secondary fragmentation, and collapse		

Legend - Additional information relevant to the glazing of the structure.	High Hazard Glazing fails and fragments will be projected into the building at high speed.	Low Hazard Glazing is likely to shatter and fragments projected into building will only travel a short distance.	No Hazard Glazing may fail but should be retained in frame.
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INBOUND THREATS							
Location & Likely Threat	Rest Centre (Departures)	Term. Cont.	Admiralty Building	Cargo Sheds	Passenger Services Building (E)	Passenger Services Building (W)	Pass. Access @ 8&9
Freight Scanner (VBIED-Small Truck)	Structural- Wall panel fails and secondary fragmentation behind	Structural-Walls demolished, secondary fragmentation, and collapse.					
Freight Canopy (VBIED-Small Truck)	Structural-Wall panel fails and secondary fragmentation behind.	Structural-Wall will suffer some damage.					
Freight Search Bays (VBIED-Small Truck)	Structural-Wall panel fails and secondary fragmentation behind.	Structural-Some fragmentation damage may occur.				Structural-Cladding may suffer some deflection and may be projected inside.	
Coach Canopy Foot pax (Suitcase IED)							
Car Halls (VBIED- Car)		Red					

Legend - Additional information relevant to the glazing of the structure.	High Hazard Glazing fails and fragments will be projected into the building at high speed.	Low Hazard Glazing is likely to shatter and fragments projected into building will only travel a short distance.	No Hazard Glazing may fail but should be retained in frame.
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Western Docks Shelter Schedule

Dec 2011 - These are suggested locations only. They have not yet been verified by a structural expert to determine protection from blast.


Emergency Action Plan – Place of Internal Refuge Survey (Sept 2011) Western Docks

<u>Serial</u>	<u>Building</u>	<u>Refuge Location</u>	<u>Potential Capacity SHELTER</u>	<u>Potential Capacity REFUGE</u>	<u>Staff Accommodated</u>	<u>Comment (Strengths / weaknesses)</u>
1	Cruise Terminal 1	Public toilets in 1 st floor departure lounge	50		DHB Cruise Staff, DHB Security Provider	Building has glass roof virtually entire length. Therefore very little protection in main building from IED. However small internal rooms do give greater level of protection, especially from falling glass. i.e. public toilets
2	Cruise Terminal 1	Undercroft (located under Departure Lounge)		200	Public	Glass fragments are still a hazard but good shelter from contaminants.
3	Cruise Terminal 1	Waiting Rooms in 'platform' area		100	Public	As above
4	Cruise Terminal 2	Undercroft (located under Departure Lounge)	500		DHB Cruise Staff, DHB Security provider, Public	Good level of protection, solid walls all round, metal roller doors, toilets and water available.
5	MOTIS	Toilets 1 st Floor (DHB controlled)	30		MOTIS Staff, Tugs	Internal room, no glass. Water and toilet facilities.
6	MOTIS	Ground floor MOTIS Office		50	MOTIS Staff, Tugs, UKBF, Drivers	Glass windows no protection from IED. Good protection from contaminants
7	Marina	Marina Building		10	DHB Marina Staff	Glass all round, no internal refuge, shelter only
		TOTALS	580	360		

Refuge:- That which shelters or protects from danger, or from distress or calamity; a stronghold which protects by its strength.

Shelter:- That which covers or defends from injury or annoyance; a protection; a screen.

Appendix 4 – A Decision Making Flow Chart





Appendix 5 – Police Powers

Terrorism Act 2000

Sec. 36 Police powers.

(1) A constable in uniform may—

- (a) Order a person in a cordoned area to leave it immediately;
- (b) Order a person immediately to leave premises which are wholly or partly in or adjacent to a cordoned area;
- (c) Order the driver or person in charge of a vehicle in a cordoned area to move it from the area immediately;
- (d) Arrange for the removal of a vehicle from a cordoned area;
- (e) Arrange for the movement of a vehicle within a cordoned area;
- (f) Prohibit or restrict access to a cordoned area by pedestrians or vehicles.

(2) A person commits an offence if he fails to comply with an order, prohibition or restriction imposed by virtue of subsection (1).

Common Law

Save & preserve life

Police officers have a common law duty to save and preserve life.

Obstruction of Police Officer in execution of duty (Save life) - Breach of the Peace

A police constable may take any reasonable action to stop a breach of the peace which is occurring, or to prevent one which the constable reasonably anticipates will occur in the near future. "Any reasonable action" may, as we shall see, include arresting a person, entering premises and stopping people moving from one place to another.



Appendix 6 – Training & Exercise Schedule

Plan 'Record of Training' and 'Validation Schedule'

Training Schedule

Date	Type of training and elements tested	Participants	Outcomes	Comment

Exercise Schedule

Date	Type of training and elements tested	Participants	Outcomes	ERP Updated?
22/03/2012	Live exercise – Simulated evacuation of public from 'D' Park to PSB W	3 x DHB Staff	Paxis and PA deployed to 'communicate' directions to exercise participants. Prototype Assembly Point used at PSB W.	Yes
14/09 2014	Live exercise – simulated evacuation of eastern docks during MTFA attack (Ex Tungsten)	Volunteers, DFDS Staff, DHB Staff	MTFA audible warning system and pre-formatted MTFA warning email sent out. EAPS activated as way points.	NR

Exercise type =

'Control Post' – This type of exercise is primarily focused on communication decision making and information sharing, all critical aspects of any plan. It also tests the adequacy of the facilities to manage the incident. The control post refers to the locations or control centres where incident management take place. In effect, it is a live exercise but without any operational activity. All activity is confined to control centres.

'Table Top' - This is the most common exercise type. It is cost effective, and involves decision making and interaction between players. It is a safe learning environment but can create realistic pressure and scenarios. The exercise is driven from exercise control by a script of exercise drivers or inputs and fed in at pre determined times.

'Live Exercise' – This is the most accurate and realistic method of testing any emergency arrangements. It can be expensive and requires careful planning. In some cases live exercises are the only viable method of testing emergency arrangements, i.e. evacuation procedures.



Appendix 7 - References

- **Emergency Preparedness** – HM Government publication – 2005
- **Emergency Response and Recovery (V1)** – HM Government publication – 2005.
- **Evacuation and Shelter Guidance** – HM Government publication – 2006.
- **Emergency Shelter and Evacuation Planning** – Course material – Emergency Planning College – 2011.
- **Emergency Planning Officers Handbook** – Brian Dillon – 2009.
- **Emergency Response and Recovery (V3)** – HM Government publication – 2010.
- **General Evacuation Framework Document** – West Mercia Local Resilience Forum – 2008.
- **Planning for Emergencies – Guidance for Businesses in Planning for Evacuations and Other Incidents** – Leeds City Council – 2003.
- **Vulnerability Assessment – Port of Dover Eastern Docks** – Home Office Report VA/11/11 April 2012
- **Evacuation and Shelter Guidance** – HM Government publication – 2014
- **Firearms and Weapons Attack Guidance** – National Police Chiefs Council - 2016



Appendix 8 – Distribution List

Intranet Copy: Available to all staff on SharePoint site under **CHEQS** - 'Emergency Plans'

Dover Harbour Board

Notification:

Plan Holder	Directorate	Paper	Electronic
T. Waggott	Chief Executive		1

Issue:

S. Higgenbottom	Company Secretary	1	
Paul Wilczek	Port Resilience Co-ordinator	1	

External Organisations

Issue:

Organisation	Paper	Electronic
Dover District Council (Emergency Planning Officer)		1
Shepway District Council (Emergency Planning Officer)		1
Kent Resilience Team		1

Port Users

Issue:

Organisation	Paper	Electronic
UKBA – Al Buckle		1
P&O – Phil Alcock		1
DFDS - Russell Challenor		1
DHB Security Provider – Sarah Bennett		1
DHB Cleaning Provider		1



Appendix 9 - Version Control Schedule (only requires completion if hard copies of manual supplied)

Date	Version No	Section	Changes Made	Name
16/01/2012	1		Published to SharePoint	P Wilczek
26/06/2012	2		Updated version following site survey of potential refugees at ED by Home Office expert	P Wilczek
22/04/2013	3		Updated to new layout and amended titles/department names	Y Buddle
05/09/2013	4		Added in vessel evacuation procedures-	Y Buddle
07/03/2014	5	17	Addition of advice for firearm and weapon attacks	J Shearwood
23/04 2014	6	Appendix 1	Changes to reflect closure and demolition of Travel Centre	J Shearwood
27/08/2015	7	All	Annual review. Changes to partner names, updates of zone maps and new corporate format	J Shearwood
26/09/2016	8	All	Update to PoD terminology/titles. Update as per 2014 HMG Guidance manual Update as per NPCC Stay Safe advice	J Shearwood
30/05/2017	9	Appendix 1 Page22	Update to circumstances surrounding the use of the Departure Lounge as a Rest Area Removal of the Coastal Rides building from the Western Docks Shelter Schedule following it's demolition	J Shearwood